Security weaknesses of authenticated key agreement protocols

Authors:
Peter Nose
Affiliations:
Institute of Mathematics, Physics and Mechanics, Ljubljana, Slovenia and University of Ljubljana, FRI, Ljubljana, Slovenia
Venue:
Information Processing Letters
Year:
2011

Citing 11
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Abstract

In this paper, we analyze the protocols of Tan, Lim et al., Chen et al. and five protocols of Holbl et al. After the analysis, we found that Tan et al.@?s, Lim et al.@?s and two protocols of Holbl et al. are insecure against the impersonation attack and the man-in-the-middle attack, Chen et al.@?s protocol cannot withstand the key-compromise impersonation attack, one protocol of Holbl et al. is vulnerable to the insider attack, one allows an adversary to compute the private key of any user and one protocol allows her to compute the shared secret key.