Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
The Design and Implementation of a Secure Auction Service
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Electronic commerce: a managerial perspective
Electronic commerce: a managerial perspective
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
Electronic Payment Systems
Adding timestamps to the secure electronic auction protocol
Data & Knowledge Engineering
Towards the Equivalence of Breaking the Diffie-Hellman Protocol and Computing Discrete Algorithms
CRYPTO '94 Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Design and Verification of a Secure Electronic Auction Protocol
SRDS '98 Proceedings of the The 17th IEEE Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems
Enhanced Anonymous Auction Protocols with Freewheeling Bids
AINA '06 Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications - Volume 01
Efficient identity-based encryption without random oracles
EUROCRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Hi-index | 0.00 |
Electronic sealed-bid auction schemes usually have a common drawback, the third party (auction host) can conspire with a malicious bidder to leak all bidding prices before the opening stage. It results in the malicious bidder wining the auction with an optimal bidding price. Recently, Liaw et al. proposed an auction protocol for electronic online bidding in which they designed a deposit deduction certification for government procurement. However, it also has above mentioned flaw. Moreover, we further found that there were some extra security drawbacks in their protocol. First, the bidder can forge a bidding receipt to claim that he/she is a valid auction winner. Second, it may suffer from the third party forging attack. Third, their protocol leaked some bidders' private information to the third party, such as the bidder's bank account number and the authorization code. Thus, it cannot protect the bidder's privacy at all. In this paper, we not only point out the drawbacks from the previous scheme but also propose a new electronic auction scheme to overcome the above mentioned drawbacks. Furthermore, the computational complexity can be decreased in our online sealed-bid auction scheme.