Forgeability of Wang-Tang-Li's ID-based restrictive partially blind signature scheme

  • Authors:
  • Sheng-Li Liu;Xiao-Feng Chen;Fang-Guo Zhang

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China and State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, ...;Department of Computer Science, School of Information Science and Technology, Sun Yat-Sen University, Guangzhou, China;Department of Electronics and Communication Engineering, School of Information Science and Technology, Sun Yat-Sen University, Guangzhou, China

  • Venue:
  • Journal of Computer Science and Technology
  • Year:
  • 2008

Quantified Score

Hi-index 0.00

Visualization

Abstract

Restrictive partially blind signature (RPBS) plays an important role in designing secure electronic cash system. Very recently, Wang, Tang and Li proposed a new ID-based restrictive partially blind signature (ID-RPBS) and gave the security proof. In this paper, we present a cryptanalysis of the scheme and show that the signature scheme does not satisfy the property of unforgeability as claimed. More precisely, a user can forge a valid message-signature pair (ID, msg, info′, σ′) instead of the original one (ID, msg, info, σ), where info is the original common agreed information and info′ ≠ info. Therefore: it will be much dangerous if Wang-Tang-Li's ID-RPBS scheme is applied to the off-line electronic cash system. For example, a bank is supposed to issue an electronic coin (or bill) of $100 to a user, while the user can change the denominartiion of the coin (bill) to any value, say $100 000 000, at his will.