De-ossifying internet routing through intrinsic support for end-network and ISP selfishness

Authors:
Aditya Akella;Shuchi Chawla;Holly Esquivel;Chitra Muthukrishnan
Affiliations:
UW-Madison, Madison, WI, USA;UW-Madison, Madison, WI, USA;UW-Madison, Madison, WI, USA;UW-Madison, Madison, WI, USA
Venue:
Proceedings of the ACM SIGMETRICS joint international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Year:
2011

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Abstract

We present the S4R supplemental routing system to address the constraints BGP places on ISPs and stub network alike. Technical soundness and economic viability are equal first class design requirements for S4R. In S4R, ISPs announce links connecting different parts of the Internet. ISPs can selfishly price their links to attract maximal amount of traffic. Stub networks can selfishly select paths that best meet their requirements at the lowest cost. We design a variety of practical algorithms for ISP and stub network response that strike a balance between accommodating selfishness of all participants and ensuring efficient and stable operation overall. We employ large scale simulations over realistic scenarios to show that S4R operates at a close-to-optimal state and that it encourages broad participation from stubs and ISPs.