The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - STOC 2002
Bottleneck links, variable demand, and the tragedy of the commons
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Nash Equilibria and the Price of Anarchy for Flows over Time
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Braess's paradox for flows over time
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Existence and uniqueness of equilibria for flows over time
ICALP'11 Proceedings of the 38th international conference on Automata, languages and programming - Volume Part II
A Stackelberg strategy for routing flow over time
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
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Network routing games are used to understand the impact of individual users' decisions on network efficiency. Prior work on routing games uses a simplified model of network flow where all flow exists simultaneously. In our work, we examine routing games in a flow-over-time model. We show that by reducing network capacity judiciously, the network owner can ensure that the equilibrium is no worse than a small constant times the optimal in the original network, for two natural measures of optimality. These are the first upper bounds on the price of anarchy in the flow-over-time model for general networks.