Scalable application layer multicast
Proceedings of the 2002 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
BRITE: An Approach to Universal Topology Generation
MASCOTS '01 Proceedings of the Ninth International Symposium in Modeling, Analysis and Simulation of Computer and Telecommunication Systems
End-to-end available bandwidth: measurement methodology, dynamics, and relation with TCP throughput
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Optimal Resource Allocation in Overlay Multicast
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
Characterizing overlay multicast networks and their costs
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Dynamic Bandwidth Auctions in Multioverlay P2P Streaming with Network Coding
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
Bittorrent is an auction: analyzing and improving bittorrent's incentives
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2008 conference on Data communication
On Game Theoretic Peer Selection for Resilient Peer-to-Peer Media Streaming
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
Journal of Network and Systems Management
Rate allocation in overlay networks based on theory of firm consumer
HPCA'09 Proceedings of the Second international conference on High Performance Computing and Applications
Market-based self-optimization for autonomic service overlay networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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Since the users of overlay multicast networks belong to different administrative domains, they are selfish in nature; resulting in degradation of performance. That is why strategic behavior modeling is a hot topic in the area of the overlay multicast networks. Mechanism design is the most versatile tool for strategic behavior modeling in microeconomics. In this paper, we model the strategic behavior of the selfish peers by leveraging the rich theory of mechanism design using the concept of economic auctions. By considering the bandwidth of services as the commodity, we design a revenue-maximizing auction mechanism. The sellers are either the origin servers or the peers who forward the digital multimedia content to their downstream peers. For each seller, the corresponding downstream peers play the role of buyers who are referred to as bidders. Each bidder submits a sealed bid to the corresponding seller. The highest bidder wins and pays its bid for the service. Also, we derive analytical closed-form expressions for upper bounds relevant to the performance metrics. The experimental validation proves the scalability and the efficiency of the proposed mechanism.