Adaptive pricing that can withstand buyer collusion of false-type-declaration
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Incentive Engineering in Wireless LAN Based Access Networks
ICNP '02 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols
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Distributed Implementations of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms
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International Journal of Electronic Commerce - Special issue: Intelligent agents for electronic commerce
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IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
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ICDCS '07 Proceedings of the 27th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
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CCGRID '09 Proceedings of the 2009 9th IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Cluster Computing and the Grid
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AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
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ICQT'06 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Internet Charging and QoS Technologies: performability has its Price
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IEEE Network: The Magazine of Global Internetworking
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Telecommunication networks are now an interconnection of competitive operators that need to cooperate to ensure end-to-end delivery of traffic. Inter-domain agreements have to be performed, and pricing is seen as a relevant way to provide an incentive to intermediate domains for forwarding the traffic of others. In this paper, we first review propositions from the literature. Greatest consideration is given to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction because it provides appropriate incentives, leads to an efficient use of the network and satisfies other relevant properties. We highlight, on the other hand, that it is neither budgetbalanced nor robust to collusion--something forgotten in the inter-domain context. This brings us to review the list of properties that we would ideally like the inter-domain pricing scheme to satisfy, and claim that no mechanism can satisfy all of them together. We then adapt to inter-domain other resource allocation and pricing schemes, and discuss which properties are or should be relaxed.