Competitive routing in multiuser communication networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Optimization flow control—I: basic algorithm and convergence
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
The Mathematics of Internet Congestion Control (Systems and Control: Foundations and Applications)
The Mathematics of Internet Congestion Control (Systems and Control: Foundations and Applications)
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Sink Equilibria and Convergence
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Bottleneck links, variable demand, and the tragedy of the commons
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Theoretical Computer Science - Automata, languages and programming: Algorithms and complexity (ICALP-A 2004)
Algorithms for pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games
Journal of Experimental Algorithmics (JEA)
Pure Nash equilibria in player-specific and weighted congestion games
Theoretical Computer Science
Network Design with Weighted Players
Theory of Computing Systems - Special Issue: Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures 2006; Guest Editors: Robert Kleinberg and Christian Scheideler
Efficiency of Scalar-Parameterized Mechanisms
Operations Research
Fast and compact: a simple class of congestion games
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
SIAM Journal on Computing
Characterizing the Existence of Potential Functions in Weighted Congestion Games
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
On the existence of pure nash equilibria inweighted congestion games
ICALP'10 Proceedings of the 37th international colloquium conference on Automata, languages and programming
The equilibrium existence problem in finite network congestion games
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Routing (un-) splittable flow in games with player-specific linear latency functions
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
A scalable network resource allocation mechanism with bounded efficiency loss
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Fundamental design issues for the future Internet
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Demand allocation games: integrating discrete and continuous strategy spaces
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
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We initiate the study of congestion games with variable demands where the (variable) demand has to be assigned to exactly one subset of resources. The players' incentives to use higher demands are stimulated by non-decreasing and concave utility functions. The payoff for a player is defined as the difference between the utility of the demand and the associated cost on the used resources. Although this class of non-cooperative games captures many elements of real-world applications, it has not been studied in this generality, to our knowledge, in the past. We study the fundamental problem of the existence of pure Nash equilibria (PNE for short) in congestion games with variable demands. We call a set of cost functions C consistent if every congestion game with variable demands and cost functions in C possesses a PNE. We say that C is FIP consistent if every such game possesses the α-Finite Improvement Property for every α 0. Our main results provide a complete characterization of consistency of cost functions revealing structural differences to congestion games with fixed demands (weighted congestion games), where in the latter even inhomogeneously exponential functions are FIP consistent. Finally, we study consistency and FIP consistency of cost functions in a slightly different class of games, where every player experiences the same cost on a resource (uniform cost model). We give a characterization of consistency and FIP consistency showing that only homogeneously exponential functions are consistent while no functions are FIP consistent.