PERCOMW '04 Proceedings of the Second IEEE Annual Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops
Privacy and security in library RFID: issues, practices, and architectures
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A Lightweight RFID Protocol to protect against Traceability and Cloning attacks
SECURECOMM '05 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks
Mutual authentication protocol for RFID conforming to EPC Class 1 Generation 2 standards
Computer Standards & Interfaces
Defining Strong Privacy for RFID
PERCOMW '07 Proceedings of the Fifth IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops
RFID authentication protocol for low-cost tags
WiSec '08 Proceedings of the first ACM conference on Wireless network security
Elliptic-Curve-Based Security Processor for RFID
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Attacks and improvements to an RIFD mutual authentication protocol and its extensions
Proceedings of the second ACM conference on Wireless network security
Security of RFID Protocols -- A Case Study
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Scalable RFID Pseudonym Protocol
NSS '09 Proceedings of the 2009 Third International Conference on Network and System Security
LRMAP: lightweight and resynchronous mutual authentication protocol for RFID system
ICUCT'06 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Ubiquitous convergence technology
Low-cost and strong-security RFID authentication protocol
EUC'07 Proceedings of the 2007 conference on Emerging direction in embedded and ubiquitous computing
Challenge-eesponse based RFID authentication protocol for distributed database environment
SPC'05 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Security in Pervasive Computing
Security analysis of an ultra-lightweight RFID authentication protocol—SLMAP*
Security and Communication Networks
Unbalanced states violates RFID privacy
Journal of Intelligent Manufacturing
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RFID technology continues to flourish as an inherent part of virtually every ubiquitous environment. However, it became clear that the public--implying the industry--seriously needs mechanisms emerging the security and privacy issues for increasing RFID applications. As the nodes of RFID systems mostly suffer from low computational power and small memory size, various attempts which propose to implement the existing security primitives and protocols, have ignored the realm of the cost limitations and failed. In this study, two recently proposed protocols--SSM and LRMAP--claiming to meet the standard privacy and security requirements are analyzed. The design of both protocols based on defining states where the server authenticates the tag in constant time in a more frequent normal state and needs a linear search in a rare abnormal states. Although both protocols claim to provide untraceability criteria in their design objectives, we outline a generic attack that both protocols failed to fulfill this claim. Moreover, we showed that the SSM protocol is vulnerable to a desynchronization attack which prevents a server from authenticating a legitimate tag. Resultantly, we conclude that defining computationally unbalanced tag states yields to a security/scalability conflict for RFID authentication protocols.