Fault Injection Attack on A5/3

  • Authors:

  • Kitae Jeong;Yuseop Lee;Jaechul Sung;Seokhie Hong

  • Affiliations:

  • -;-;-;-

  • Venue:
  • ISPA '11 Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE Ninth International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Processing with Applications
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

In this paper, we propose a fault injection attack on A5/3 used in GSM. This attack is based on the fault assumption in [9]. That is, it is assumed that we can decrease the number of rounds in block cipher KASUMI of A5/3 by injecting some faults. With small number of fault injections, we can recover the session key of A5/3 supporting a 64-bit session key. This is the first known cryptanalytic result on A5/3 so far.