Timing is everything: the importance of history detection
ESORICS'11 Proceedings of the 16th European conference on Research in computer security
App isolation: get the security of multiple browsers with just one
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
The web interface should be radically refactored
Proceedings of the 10th ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks
User tracking on the web via cross-browser fingerprinting
NordSec'11 Proceedings of the 16th Nordic conference on Information Security Technology for Applications
Privacy preservation of user history graph
WISTP'12 Proceedings of the 6th IFIP WG 11.2 international conference on Information Security Theory and Practice: security, privacy and trust in computing systems and ambient intelligent ecosystems
ARC: protecting against HTTP parameter pollution attacks using application request caches
ACNS'12 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
Tracking the trackers: fast and scalable dynamic analysis of web content for privacy violations
ACNS'12 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
WOOT'12 Proceedings of the 6th USENIX conference on Offensive Technologies
FlowFox: a web browser with flexible and precise information flow control
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Scriptless attacks: stealing the pie without touching the sill
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
The bug that made me president a browser- and web-security case study on helios voting
VoteID'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on E-Voting and Identity
Embassies: radically refactoring the web
nsdi'13 Proceedings of the 10th USENIX conference on Networked Systems Design and Implementation
TabShots: client-side detection of tabnabbing attacks
Proceedings of the 8th ACM SIGSAC symposium on Information, computer and communications security
Cross-origin pixel stealing: timing attacks using CSS filters
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
Auto-FBI: a user-friendly approach for secure access to sensitive content on the web
Proceedings of the 29th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Flow stealing: A well-timed redirection attack
Journal of Computer Security - Research in Computer Security and Privacy: Emerging Trends
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History sniffing attacks allow web sites to learn about users' visits to other sites. The major browsers have recently adopted a defense against the current strategies for history sniffing. In a user study with 307 participants, we demonstrate that history sniffing remains feasible via interactive techniques which are not covered by the defense. While these techniques are slower and cannot hope to learn as much about users' browsing history, we see no practical way to defend against them.