A machine-checked framework for relational separation logic
SEFM'11 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Software engineering and formal methods
A semantic hierarchy for erasure policies
ICISS'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information Systems Security
Proving acceptability properties of relaxed nondeterministic approximate programs
Proceedings of the 33rd ACM SIGPLAN conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation
Verification of information flow properties of java programs without approximations
FoVeOOS'11 Proceedings of the 2011 international conference on Formal Verification of Object-Oriented Software
Faceted execution of policy-agnostic programs
Proceedings of the Eighth ACM SIGPLAN workshop on Programming languages and analysis for security
Dependent Type Theory for Verification of Information Flow and Access Control Policies
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
Relational abstract interpretation for the verification of 2-hypersafety properties
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
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We present Relational Hoare Type Theory (RHTT), a novel language and verification system capable of expressing and verifying rich information flow and access control policies via dependent types. We show that a number of security policies which have been formalized separately in the literature can all be expressed in RHTT using only standard type-theoretic constructions such as monads, higher-order functions, abstract types, abstract predicates, and modules. Example security policies include conditional declassification, information erasure, and state-dependent information flow and access control. RHTT can reason about such policies in the presence of dynamic memory allocation, deallocation, pointer aliasing and arithmetic. The system, theorems and examples have all been formalized in Coq.