Multiple facets for dynamic information flow
POPL '12 Proceedings of the 39th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Typing illegal information flows as program effects
Proceedings of the 7th Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security
Towards fully automatic placement of security sanitizers and declassifiers
POPL '13 Proceedings of the 40th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Faceted execution of policy-agnostic programs
Proceedings of the Eighth ACM SIGPLAN workshop on Programming languages and analysis for security
| Hi-index | 0.01 |
We explore the inference of expressive human-readable declassification policies as a step towards providing practical tools and techniques for strong language-based information security. Security-type systems can enforce expressive information-security policies, but can require enormous programmer effort before any security benefit is realized. To reduce the burden on the programmer, we focus on inference of expressive yet intuitive information-security policies from programs with few programmer annotations. We define a novel security policy language that can express what information a program may release, under what conditions (or, when) such release may occur, and which procedures are involved with the release (or, where in the code the release occur). We describe a dataflow analysis for precisely inferring these policies, and build a tool that instantiates this analysis for the Java programming language. We validate the policies, analysis, and our implementation by applying the tool to a collection of simple Java programs.