Multiple facets for dynamic information flow
POPL '12 Proceedings of the 39th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Language-based control and mitigation of timing channels
Proceedings of the 33rd ACM SIGPLAN conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation
NordSec'11 Proceedings of the 16th Nordic conference on Information Security Technology for Applications
Addressing covert termination and timing channels in concurrent information flow systems
Proceedings of the 17th ACM SIGPLAN international conference on Functional programming
Better security and privacy for web browsers: a survey of techniques, and a new implementation
FAST'11 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Formal Aspects of Security and Trust
Secure multi-execution through static program transformation
FMOODS'12/FORTE'12 Proceedings of the 14th joint IFIP WG 6.1 international conference and Proceedings of the 32nd IFIP WG 6.1 international conference on Formal Techniques for Distributed Systems
FlowFox: a web browser with flexible and precise information flow control
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Precise enforcement of progress-sensitive security
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Faceted execution of policy-agnostic programs
Proceedings of the Eighth ACM SIGPLAN workshop on Programming languages and analysis for security
Position paper: Sapper -- a language for provable hardware policy enforcement
Proceedings of the Eighth ACM SIGPLAN workshop on Programming languages and analysis for security
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Secure information flow guarantees the secrecy and integrity of data, preventing an attacker from learning secret information (secrecy) or injecting untrusted information (integrity). Covert channels can be used to subvert these security guarantees, for example, timing and termination channels can, either intentionally or inadvertently, violate these guarantees by modifying the timing or termination behavior of a program based on secret or untrusted data. Attacks using these covert channels have been published and are known to work in practiceâ聙"as techniques to prevent non-covert channels are becoming increasingly practical, covert channels are likely to become even more attractive for attackers to exploit. The goal of this paper is to understand the subtleties of timing- and termination-sensitive noninterference, explore the space of possible strategies for enforcing noninterference guarantees, and formalize the exact guarantees that these strategies can enforce. As a result of this effort we create a novel strategy that provides stronger security guarantees than existing work, and we clarify claims in existing work about what guarantees can be made.