FAUST: efficient, TTP-free abuse prevention by anonymous whitelisting
Proceedings of the 10th annual ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
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We present several extensions to the Nymble framework for anonymous blacklisting systems. First, we show how to distribute the Verinym Issuer as a threshold entity. This provides liveness against a threshold Byzantine adversary and protects against denial-of-service attacks. Second, we describe how to revoke a user for a period spanning multiple link ability windows. This gives service providers more flexibility in deciding how long to block individual users. We also point out how our solution enables efficient blacklist transferability among service providers. Third, we augment the Verinym Acquisition Protocol for Tor-aware systems (that utilize IP addresses as a unique identifier) to handle two additional cases: 1) the operator of a Tor exit node wishes to access services protected by the system, and 2) a user's access to the Verinym Issuer (and the Tor network) is blocked by a firewall. Finally, we revisit the objective blacklisting mechanism used in Jack, and generalize this idea to enable objective blacklisting in other Nymble-like systems. We illustrate the approach by showing how to implement it in Nymble and Nymbler.