Formal enforcement of security policies on concurrent systems

Authors:
Mahjoub Langar;Mohamed Mejri;Kamel Adi
Affiliations:
LSFM Group, Computer Science Department, Laval University, Quebec, QC, Canada;LSFM Group, Computer Science Department, Laval University, Quebec, QC, Canada;LRSI Group, Computer Science Department, University of Quebec in Outaouais, Gatineau, QC, Canada
Venue:
Journal of Symbolic Computation
Year:
2011

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Abstract

This paper introduces a formal and modular technique allowing to automatically enforce a security policy on a given concurrent system. Given a concurrent program P and a security policy @f, we automatically generate another program P^' that satisfies @f and behaves like P, except that it stops when P tries to violate the security policy @f. We use extended version of process algebra ACP (Algebra of Communicating Process) and BPA (Basic Process Algebra) as formal languages to specify both concurrent system and security policy.