Mathematical modeling of competition in sponsored search market
Proceedings of the 2010 Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems, and Computation
A study of non-neutral networks with usage-based prices
ETM'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Incentives, overlays, and economic traffic control
On cooperative settlement between content, transit, and eyeball internet service providers
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Comparison of search engines non-neutral and neutral behaviors
ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review
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This paper studies economic utilities and quality of service (QoS) in a two-sided non-neutral market where Internet service providers (ISPs) charge content providers (CPs) for the content delivery. We propose new models that involve a CP, an ISP, end users and advertisers. The CP may have either a subscription revenue model (charging end users) or an advertisement revenue model (charging advertisers). We formulate the interactions between the ISP and the CP as a noncooperative game for the former and an optimization problem for the latter. Our analysis shows that the revenue model of the CP plays a significant role in a non-neutral Internet. With the subscription model, both the ISP and the CP receive better (or worse) utilities as well as QoS in the presence of the side payment at the same time. With the advertisement model, the side payment impedes the CP from investing on its contents.