Studying the impact of hardware prefetching and bandwidth partitioning in chip-multiprocessors
Proceedings of the ACM SIGMETRICS joint international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Cost-effectively offering private buffers in SoCs and CMPs
Proceedings of the international conference on Supercomputing
Studying the impact of hardware prefetching and bandwidth partitioning in chip-multiprocessors
ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review - Performance evaluation review
Buffer-integrated-Cache: a cost-effective SRAM architecture for handheld and embedded platforms
Proceedings of the 48th Design Automation Conference
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The ever increasing size and complexity of Operating System (OS) kernel code bring an inevitable increase in the number of security vulnerabilities that can be exploited by attackers. A successful security attack on the kernel has a profound impact that may affect all processes running on it. In this paper we propose an architectural framework that provides survivability to the OS kernel, i.e. able to keep normal system operation despite security faults. It consists of three components that work together: (1) security attack detection, (2) security fault isolation, and (3) a recovery mechanism that resumes normal system operation. Through simple but carefully-designed architecture support, we provide OS kernel survivability with low performance overheads (