Congestion games with failures

  • Authors:

  • Michal Penn;Maria Polukarov;Moshe Tennenholtz

  • Affiliations:

  • Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion, Haifa 32000, Israel;School of Electronics and Computer Science, University of Southampton, Southampton SO17 1BJ, United Kingdom;Microsoft Israel R&D Center, 13 Shenkar Street, Herzeliya 46725, Israel and Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion, Haifa 32000, Israel

  • Venue:
  • Discrete Applied Mathematics
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

We introduce a new class of games, congestion games with failures (CGFs), which allows for resource failures in congestion games. In a CGF, players share a common set of resources (service providers), where each service provider (SP) may fail with some known probability (that may be constant or depend on the congestion on the resource). For reliability reasons, a player may choose a subset of the SPs in order to try and perform his task. The cost of a player for utilizing any SP is a function of the total number of players using this SP. A main feature of this setting is that the cost for a player for successful completion of his task is the minimum of the costs of his successful attempts. We show that although CGFs do not, in general, admit a (generalized ordinal) potential function and the finite improvement property (and thus are not isomorphic to congestion games), they always possess a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Moreover, every best reply dynamics converges to an equilibrium in any given CGF, and the SPs' congestion experienced in different equilibria is (almost) unique. Furthermore, we provide an efficient procedure for computing a pure strategy equilibrium in CGFs and show that every best equilibrium (one minimizing the sum of the players' disutilities) is semi-strong. Finally, for the subclass of symmetric CGFs we give a constructive characterization of best and worst equilibria.