Kademlia: A Peer-to-Peer Information System Based on the XOR Metric
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
Secure routing for structured peer-to-peer overlay networks
OSDI '02 Proceedings of the 5th symposium on Operating systems design and implementationCopyright restrictions prevent ACM from being able to make the PDFs for this conference available for downloading
How to spread adversarial nodes?: rotate!
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Exploiting P2P systems for DDoS attacks
InfoScale '06 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Scalable information systems
Towards a scalable and robust DHT
Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
Understanding churn in peer-to-peer networks
Proceedings of the 6th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement
Exploiting KAD: possible uses and misuses
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
BotTorrent: misusing BitTorrent to launch DDoS attacks
SRUTI'07 Proceedings of the 3rd USENIX workshop on Steps to reducing unwanted traffic on the internet
Robust random number generation for peer-to-peer systems
Theoretical Computer Science
A survey of peer-to-peer security issues
ISSS'02 Proceedings of the 2002 Mext-NSF-JSPS international conference on Software security: theories and systems
A first look at peer-to-peer worms: threats and defenses
IPTPS'05 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Peer-to-Peer Systems
A taxonomy of rational attacks
IPTPS'05 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Peer-to-Peer Systems
Misusing unstructured p2p systems to perform dos attacks: the network that never forgets
ACNS'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
eDonkey & eMule's Kad: Measurements & Attacks
Fundamenta Informaticae
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Since the demise of the Overnet network, the Kad network has become not only the most popular but also the only widely used peer-to-peer system based on a distributed hash table. It is likely that its user base will continue to grow in numbers over the next few years as, unlike the eDonkey network, it does not depend on central servers, which increases scalability and reliability. Moreover, the Kad network is more efficient than unstructured systems such as Gnutella. However, we show that today's Kad network can be attacked in several ways by carrying out several (well-known) attacks on the Kad network. The presented attacks could be used either to hamper the correct functioning of the network itself, to censor contents, or to harm other entities in the Internet not participating in the Kad network such as ordinary web servers. While there are simple heuristics to reduce the impact of some of the attacks, we believe that the presented attacks cannot be thwarted easily in any fully decentralized peer-to-peer system without some kind of a centralized certification and verification authority.