Making greed work in networks: a game-theoretic analysis of switch service disciplines
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Distributed algorithmic mechanism design: recent results and future directions
DIALM '02 Proceedings of the 6th international workshop on Discrete algorithms and methods for mobile computing and communications
A Game Theoretic Framework for Incentives in P2P Systems
P2P '03 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing
Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Modeling and performance analysis of BitTorrent-like peer-to-peer networks
Proceedings of the 2004 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Experiences applying game theory to system design
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Practice and theory of incentives in networked systems
Computational-Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms
IEEE Intelligent Systems
Clustering and sharing incentives in BitTorrent systems
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM SIGMETRICS international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Bittorrent is an auction: analyzing and improving bittorrent's incentives
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2008 conference on Data communication
Collaboration in BitTorrent Systems
NETWORKING '09 Proceedings of the 8th International IFIP-TC 6 Networking Conference
BarterCast: A practical approach to prevent lazy freeriding in P2P networks
IPDPS '09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Symposium on Parallel&Distributed Processing
Replica Placement in P2P Storage: Complexity and Game Theoretic Analyses
ICDCS '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE 30th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Improving peer-to-peer file distribution: winner doesn't have to take all
Proceedings of the first ACM asia-pacific workshop on Workshop on systems
Characterization of BitTorrent swarms and their distribution in the Internet
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Do incentives build robustness in bit torrent
NSDI'07 Proceedings of the 4th USENIX conference on Networked systems design & implementation
An empirical study of free-riding behavior in the maze p2p file-sharing system
IPTPS'05 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Peer-to-Peer Systems
Exploring the policy selection of P2P VoD system: a simulation based research
Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE 20th International Workshop on Quality of Service
A task-based model for the lifespan of peer-to-peer swarms
IFIP'12 Proceedings of the 11th international IFIP TC 6 conference on Networking - Volume Part II
The Peer's Dilemma: A general framework to examine cooperation in pure peer-to-peer systems
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
BitTorrent-like P2P approaches for VoD: A comparative study
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Non-monetary fair scheduling: a cooperative game theory approach
Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
EnhancedBit: Unleashing the potential of the unchoking policy in the BitTorrent protocol
Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing
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Distributed systems without a central authority, such as peer-to-peer (P2P) systems, employ incentives to encourage nodes to follow the prescribed protocol. Game theoretic analysis is often used to evaluate incentives in such systems. However, most game-theoretic analyses of distributed systems do not adequately model the repeated interactions of nodes inherent in such systems. We present a game-theoretic analysis of a popular P2P protocol, Bit-Torrent, that models the repeated interactions in such protocols. We also note that an analytical approach for modeling incentives is often infeasible given the complicated nature of most deployed protocols. In order to comprehensively model incentives in complex protocols, we propose a simulation-based method, which we call Design Space Analysis (DSA). DSA provides a tractable analysis of competing protocol variants within a detailed design space. We apply DSA to P2P file swarming systems. With extensive simulations we analyze a wide-range of protocol variants and gain insights into their robustness and performance. To validate these results and to demonstrate the efficacy of DSA, we modify an instrumented BitTorrent client and evaluate protocols discovered using DSA. We show that they yield higher system performance and robustness relative to the reference implementation.