Stackelberg games for adversarial prediction problems

  • Authors:
  • Michael Brückner;Tobias Scheffer

  • Affiliations:
  • University of Potsdam, Potsdam, Germany;University of Potsdam, Potsdam, Germany

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 17th ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

The standard assumption of identically distributed training and test data is violated when test data are generated in response to a predictive model. This becomes apparent, for example, in the context of email spam filtering, where an email service provider employs a spam filter and the spam sender can take this filter into account when generating new emails. We model the interaction between learner and data generator as a Stackelberg competition in which the learner plays the role of the leader and the data generator may react on the leader's move. We derive an optimization problem to determine the solution of this game and present several instances of the Stackelberg prediction game. We show that the Stackelberg prediction game generalizes existing prediction models. Finally, we explore properties of the discussed models empirically in the context of email spam filtering.