Analysis of reduced-SHAvite-3-256 v2

  • Authors:
  • Marine Minier;María Naya-Plasencia;Thomas Peyrin

  • Affiliations:
  • Université de Lyon, INRIA, CITI, France;FHNW, Windisch, Switzerland;Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

  • Venue:
  • FSE'11 Proceedings of the 18th international conference on Fast software encryption
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

In this article, we provide the first independent analysis of the (2nd-round tweaked) 256-bit version of the SHA-3 candidate SHAvite-3. By leveraging recently introduced cryptanalysis tools such as rebound attack or Super-Sbox cryptanalysis, we are able to derive chosen-related-salt distinguishing attacks on the compression function on up to 8 rounds (12 rounds in total) and free-start collisions on up to 7 rounds. In particular, our best results are obtained by carefully controlling the differences in the key schedule of the internal cipher. Most of our results have been implemented and verified experimentally.