Cryptanalysis of the knapsack generator

Authors:
Simon Knellwolf;Willi Meier
Affiliations:
FHNW, Switzerland;FHNW, Switzerland
Venue:
FSE'11 Proceedings of the 18th international conference on Fast software encryption
Year:
2011

Citing 10
Cited 0

Analysis and design of stream ciphers

Analysis and design of stream ciphers
On Lova´sz' lattice reduction and the nearest lattice point problem

Combinatorica
Correlation immunity and the summation generator

Lecture notes in computer sciences; 218 on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO 85
Correlation properties of combiners with memory in stream ciphers (extended abstract)

EUROCRYPT '90 Proceedings of the workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
Handbook of Applied Cryptography

Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Cryptographic Significance of the Carry for Ciphers Based on Integer Addition

CRYPTO '90 Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Networked RFID Systems and Lightweight Cryptography: Raising Barriers to Product Counterfeiting

Networked RFID Systems and Lightweight Cryptography: Raising Barriers to Product Counterfeiting
An Introduction to Mathematical Cryptography

An Introduction to Mathematical Cryptography
Predicting subset sum pseudorandom generators

SAC'04 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Selected Areas in Cryptography
New generic algorithms for hard knapsacks

EUROCRYPT'10 Proceedings of the 29th Annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

The knapsack generator was introduced in 1985 by Rueppel and Massey as a novel LFSR-based stream cipher construction. Its output sequence attains close to maximum linear complexity and its relation to the knapsack problem suggests strong security. In this paper we analyze the security of practically relevant instances of this generator as they are recommended for the use in RFID systems, for example. We describe a surprisingly effective guess and determine strategy, which leads to practical attacks on small instances and shows that the security margin of larger instances is smaller than expected. We also briefly discuss a variant of the knapsack generator recently proposed by von zur Gathen and Shparlinski and show that this variant should not be used for cryptographic applications.