SCUBA: Secure Code Update By Attestation in sensor networks
WiSe '06 Proceedings of the 5th ACM workshop on Wireless security
Address obfuscation: an efficient approach to combat a board range of memory error exploits
SSYM'03 Proceedings of the 12th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 12
Design and implementation of a TCG-based integrity measurement architecture
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
SecVisor: a tiny hypervisor to provide lifetime kernel code integrity for commodity OSes
Proceedings of twenty-first ACM SIGOPS symposium on Operating systems principles
When good instructions go bad: generalizing return-oriented programming to RISC
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Hypervisor support for identifying covertly executing binaries
SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
Effective implementation of the cell broadband engine™ isolation loader
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
HIMA: A Hypervisor-Based Integrity Measurement Agent
ACSAC '09 Proceedings of the 2009 Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Cumulative attestation kernels for embedded systems
ESORICS'09 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Research in computer security
TrustVisor: Efficient TCB Reduction and Attestation
SP '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
HyperSentry: enabling stealthy in-context measurement of hypervisor integrity
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
HyperCheck: a hardware-assisted integrity monitor
RAID'10 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Recent advances in intrusion detection
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Malware often injects and executes new code to infect hypervisors, OSs and applications. Such malware infections can be prevented by checking all code against a whitelist before permitting it to execute. The eXecuting Implies Verified Enforcer (XIVE) is a distributed system in which a kernel on each target system consults a server called the approver to verify code on-demand.We propose a new hardware mechanism to isolate the XIVE kernel from the target host. The Integrity-Aware Processor (IAP) that embodies this mechanism is based on a SPARC soft-core for an FPGA and provides high performance, high compatibility with target systems and flexible invocation options to ensure visibility into the target system. This facilitates the development of a very small trusted computing base.