On inferring autonomous system relationships in the internet
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Understanding BGP misconfiguration
Proceedings of the 2002 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Collecting the internet AS-level topology
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Understanding the network-level behavior of spammers
Proceedings of the 2006 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Accurate Real-time Identification of IP Prefix Hijacking
SP '07 Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Ispy: detecting ip prefix hijacking on my own
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2008 conference on Data communication
Autonomous security for autonomous systems
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Locating prefix hijackers using LOCK
SSYM'09 Proceedings of the 18th conference on USENIX security symposium
A survey of security techniques for the border gateway protocol (BGP)
IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials
A survey of trust in internet applications
IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials
BGP routing policies in ISP networks
IEEE Network: The Magazine of Global Internetworking
An approach to stabilize interdomain routing protocol after failure
Computers and Electrical Engineering
A model for recursive propagations of reputations in social networks
Proceedings of the 2013 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Advances in Social Networks Analysis and Mining
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The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) works by frequently exchanging updates that disseminate reachability information about IP prefixes (i.e., IP address blocks) between Autonomous Systems (ASes) on the Internet. The ideal operation of BGP relies on three major behavioral assumptions (BAs): (1) information contained in the update is legal and correct, (2) a route to a prefix is stable, and (3) the route adheres to the valley free routing policy. The current operation of BGP implicitly trusts all ASes to adhere to these assumptions. However, several documented violation of these assumptions attest to the fact that such an assumption of trust is perilous. This paper presents AS-TRUST, a scheme that comprehensively characterizes the trustworthiness of ASes with respect to their adherence of the behavioral assumptions. AS-TRUST quantifies trust using the notion of AS reputation. To compute reputation, AS-TRUST analyzes updates received in the past. It then classifies the resulting observations into multiple types of feedback. The feedback is used by a reputation function that uses Bayesian statistics to compute a probabilistic view of AS trustworthiness. This information can then be used for improving quotidian BGP operation by enabling improved route preference and dampening decision making at the ASes. Our implementation of AS-TRUST scheme using publicly available BGP traces demonstrates: (1) the number of ASes involved in violating the BGP behavioral assumptions is significant, and (2) the proposed reputation mechanism provides multi-fold improvement in the ability of ASes to operate in the presence of BA violations.