The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Journal of Cryptology
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Strong password-only authenticated key exchange
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
A security architecture for computational grids
CCS '98 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems
Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems
Password Authentication Using Multiple Servers
CT-RSA 2001 Proceedings of the 2001 Conference on Topics in Cryptology: The Cryptographer's Track at RSA
Threshold Password-Authenticated Key Exchange
CRYPTO '02 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Robustness Principles for Public Key Protocols
CRYPTO '95 Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Server-Assisted Generation of a Strong Secret from a Password
WETICE '00 Proceedings of the 9th IEEE International Workshops on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises
The Decision Diffie-Hellman Problem
ANTS-III Proceedings of the Third International Symposium on Algorithmic Number Theory
Extended Password Key Exchange Protocols Immune to Dictionary Attacks
WET-ICE '97 Proceedings of the 6th Workshop on Enabling Technologies on Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises
Protocols for Key Establishment and Authentication
Protocols for Key Establishment and Authentication
Encrypted Key Exchange: Password-Based Protocols SecureAgainst Dictionary Attacks
SP '92 Proceedings of the 1992 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Number theoretic attacks on secure password schemes
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Mechanisms for increasing the usability of grid security
International Journal of Human-Computer Studies - Special isssue: HCI research in privacy and security is critical now
Security analysis of a password-based authentication protocol proposed to IEEE 1363
Theoretical Computer Science
SSYM'96 Proceedings of the 6th conference on USENIX Security Symposium, Focusing on Applications of Cryptography - Volume 6
On diffie-hellman key agreement with short exponents
EUROCRYPT'96 Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Authenticated key exchange secure against dictionary attacks
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Simple password-based encrypted key exchange protocols
CT-RSA'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Topics in Cryptology
A method for making password-based key exchange resilient to server compromise
CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
SP'11 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Security Protocols
GLP: A cryptographic approach for group location privacy
Computer Communications
Composition of password-based protocols
Formal Methods in System Design
Can Jannie verify? Usability of display-equipped RFID tags for security purposes
Journal of Computer Security - Research in Computer Security and Privacy: Emerging Trends
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Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) studies how to establish secure communication between two remote parties solely based on their shared password, without requiring a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Despite extensive research in the past decade, this problem remains unsolved. Patent has been one of the biggest brakes in deploying PAKE solutions in practice. Besides, even for the patented schemes like EKE and SPEKE, their security is only heuristic; researchers have reported some subtle but worrying security issues. In this paper, we propose to tackle this problem using an approach different from all past solutions. Our protocol, Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling (J-PAKE), achieves mutual authentication in two steps: first, two parties send ephemeral public keys to each other; second, they encrypt the shared password by juggling the public keys in a verifiable way. The first use of such a juggling technique was seen in solving the Dining Cryptographers problem in 2006. Here, we apply it to solve the PAKE problem, and show that the protocol is zero-knowledge as it reveals nothing except one-bit information: whether the supplied passwords at two sides are the same. With clear advantages in security, our scheme has comparable efficiency to the EKE and SPEKE protocols.