Deontic logic in computer science: normative system specification
Deontic logic in computer science: normative system specification
Protecting privacy using the decentralized label model
ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology (TOSEM)
A model of OASIS role-based access control and its support for active security
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Towards a common API for publish/subscribe
Proceedings of the 2007 inaugural international conference on Distributed event-based systems
Information flow control for standard OS abstractions
Proceedings of twenty-first ACM SIGOPS symposium on Operating systems principles
PERMIS: a modular authorization infrastructure
Concurrency and Computation: Practice & Experience - UK e-Science All Hands Meeting 2006
Deontic logic for modelling data flow and use compliance
Proceedings of the 6th international workshop on Middleware for pervasive and ad-hoc computing
Controlling historical information dissemination in publish/subscribe
Proceedings of the 2008 workshop on Middleware security
DEFCON: high-performance event processing with information security
USENIXATC'10 Proceedings of the 2010 USENIX conference on USENIX annual technical conference
Linking Policies to the Spatial Environment
POLICY '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE International Symposium on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks
Efficient Policy Checking across Administrative Domains
POLICY '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE International Symposium on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks
Distributed middleware enforcement of event flow security policy
Proceedings of the ACM/IFIP/USENIX 11th International Conference on Middleware
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Security engineering must be integrated with all stages of application specification and development to be effective. Doing this properly is increasingly critical as organisations rush to offload their software services to cloud providers. Service-level agreements (SLAs) with these providers currently focus on performance-oriented parameters, which runs the risk of exacerbating an impedance mismatch with the security middleware. Not only do we want cloud providers to isolate each of their clients from others, we also want to have means to isolate components and users within each client's application. We propose a principled approach to designing and deploying end-to-end secure, distributed software by means of thorough, relentless tagging of the security meaning of data, analogous to what is already done for data types. The aim is to guarantee that---above a small trusted code base---data cannot be leaked by buggy or malicious software components. This is crucial for cloud infrastructures, in which the stored data and hosted services all have different owners whose interests are not aligned (and may even be in competition). We have developed data tagging schemes and enforcement techniques that can help form the aforementioned trusted code base. Our big idea---cloud-hosted services that have end-to-end information flow control---preempts worries about security and privacy violations retarding the evolution of large-scale cloud computing.