A Retrospective on the VAX VMM Security Kernel
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Secure program execution via dynamic information flow tracking
ASPLOS XI Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems
Minos: Control Data Attack Prevention Orthogonal to Memory Model
Proceedings of the 37th annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture
Raksha: a flexible information flow architecture for software security
Proceedings of the 34th annual international symposium on Computer architecture
Complete information flow tracking from the gates up
Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems
Theoretical analysis of gate level information flow tracking
Proceedings of the 47th Design Automation Conference
Predicting secret keys via branch prediction
CT-RSA'07 Proceedings of the 7th Cryptographers' track at the RSA conference on Topics in Cryptology
Simultaneous information flow security and circuit redundancy in Boolean gates
Proceedings of the International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
A practical testing framework for isolating hardware timing channels
Proceedings of the Conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe
WHISK: an uncore architecture for dynamic information flow tracking in heterogeneous embedded SoCs
Proceedings of the Ninth IEEE/ACM/IFIP International Conference on Hardware/Software Codesign and System Synthesis
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Flight control, banking, medical, and other high assurance systems have a strict requirement on correct operation. Fundamental to this is the enforcement of non-interference where particular subsystems should not affect one another. In an effort to help guarantee this policy, recent work has emerged with tracking information flows at the hardware level. This article uses a specific method known as gate-level information flow tracking (GLIFT) to provide a methodology for testing information flows in two common bus protocols, I2C and USB. We show that the protocols do elicit unintended information flows and provide a solution based on time division multiple access (TDMA) that provably isolates devices on the bus from these flows. This paper also discusses the overheads in area and simulation time incurred by this TDMA based solution.