Location Privacy in Pervasive Computing
IEEE Pervasive Computing
An Efficient System for Non-transferable Anonymous Credentials with Optional Anonymity Revocation
EUROCRYPT '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
k-anonymity: a model for protecting privacy
International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems
Location Privacy in Mobile Systems: A Personalized Anonymization Model
ICDCS '05 Proceedings of the 25th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Anonymous Usage of Location-Based Services Through Spatial and Temporal Cloaking
Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Mobile systems, applications and services
Preventing Location-Based Identity Inference in Anonymous Spatial Queries
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering
Making p2p accountable without losing privacy
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society
Protecting Privacy in Continuous Location-Tracking Applications
IEEE Security and Privacy
On the Anonymity of Home/Work Location Pairs
Pervasive '09 Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Pervasive Computing
Anonymous credentials on a standard java card
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Privacy and scalability analysis of vehicular combinatorial certificate schemes
CCNC'09 Proceedings of the 6th IEEE Conference on Consumer Communications and Networking Conference
Inference attacks on location tracks
PERVASIVE'07 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Pervasive computing
Editorial: Editorial for the Special Issue: Deploying vehicle-2-x communication
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
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Vehicle-2-X communications are hailed as the future to improve safety on the roads. Ensuring that messages sent by vehicles contain correct information is crucial to fulfill this objective, as misleading information could disrupt traffic and create potentially dangerous situations. Thus, Vehicle-2-X communication requires authentication to ensure that messages come from legitimate vehicles, and to identify vehicles that send misleading information. If a unique public key certificate per vehicle is used to authenticate messages, then the identification of misbehaving (or malfunctioning) vehicles is straightforward, and so is the revocation of their credentials. This solution however, offers no privacy protection to drivers, as the tracking of all the vehicles' movements is equally trivial. A privacy-preserving alternative is to authenticate messages using (unlinkable) one-time pseudonyms, but these protocols are computationally expensive and their certificate revocation process is more complex. Intermediate solutions that trade off privacy and efficiency are based on multiple certificates per vehicle, which may or may not be unique, that are reused to authenticate messages. In this work we analyze two such intermediate solutions that have been proposed by IntelliDrive, US Department of Transportation (DoT). We show that by exploiting the reuse of pseudonyms and spatio-temporal constraints the service provider is capable of tracking a large percentage of vehicles. Furthermore, we find that one of the schemes fails to provide privacy even if the adversary does not control the service provider and only listens to the communications of vehicles.