A graph-based system for network-vulnerability analysis
Proceedings of the 1998 workshop on New security paradigms
Experimenting with Quantitative Evaluation Tools for Monitoring Operational Security
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Scalable, graph-based network vulnerability analysis
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Automated Generation and Analysis of Attack Graphs
SP '02 Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A Systematic Approach to Multi-Stage Network Attack Analysis
IWIA '04 Proceedings of the Second IEEE International Information Assurance Workshop (IWIA'04)
Managing attack graph complexity through visual hierarchical aggregation
Proceedings of the 2004 ACM workshop on Visualization and data mining for computer security
A scalable approach to attack graph generation
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Practical Attack Graph Generation for Network Defense
ACSAC '06 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
MulVAL: a logic-based network security analyzer
SSYM'05 Proceedings of the 14th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 14
Toward measuring network security using attack graphs
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Quality of protection
Optimal security hardening using multi-objective optimization on attack tree models of networks
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
An Attack Graph-Based Probabilistic Security Metric
Proceeedings of the 22nd annual IFIP WG 11.3 working conference on Data and Applications Security
Improving Attack Graph Visualization through Data Reduction and Attack Grouping
VizSec '08 Proceedings of the 5th international workshop on Visualization for Computer Security
Extending logical attack graphs for efficient vulnerability analysis
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Measuring network security using dynamic bayesian network
Proceedings of the 4th ACM workshop on Quality of protection
Identifying Critical Attack Assets in Dependency Attack Graphs
ESORICS '08 Proceedings of the 13th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
Measuring the overall security of network configurations using attack graphs
Proceedings of the 21st annual IFIP WG 11.3 working conference on Data and applications security
CANVuS: context-aware network vulnerability scanning
RAID'10 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Recent advances in intrusion detection
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A significant challenge in evaluating network security stems from the scale of modern enterprise networks and the vast number of vulnerabilities regularly found in software applications. A common technique to deal with this complexity is attack graphs, where a tool automatically computes all possible ways a system can be broken into by analyzing the configuration of each host, the network, and the discovered vulnerabilities. Past work has proposed methodologies that postprocess "raw" attack graphs so that the result can be abstracted and becomes easier for a human user to grasp. We notice that, while visualization is a major problem caused by the multitude of attack paths in an attack graph, a more severe problem is the distorted risk picture it renders to both human users and quantitative vulnerability assessment models. We propose that abstraction be done before attack graphs are computed, instead of after. This way we can prevent the distortion in quantitative vulnerability assessment metrics, at the same time improving visualization as well. We developed an abstract network model generator that, given reachability and configuration information of a network, provides an abstracted model with much more succinct information about the system than the raw model. The model is generated by grouping hosts based on their network reachability and vulnerability information, as well as grouping vulnerabilities with similar exploitability. We show that the attack graphs generated from this type of abstracted inputs are not only much smaller, but also provide more realistic quantitative vulnerability metrics for the whole system. We conducted experiments on both synthesized and production systems to demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach.