Cryptanalysis of the compression function of SIMD

  • Authors:
  • Hongbo Yu;Xiaoyun Wang

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Computer Science and Technology, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China;Tsinghua University and Shandong University, China

  • Venue:
  • ACISP'11 Proceedings of the 16th Australasian conference on Information security and privacy
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

SIMD is one of the second round candidates of the SHA-3 competition hosted by NIST. In this paper, we present the first attack for the compression function of the reduced SIMD-256 and the full SIMD-512 (the tweaked version) using the modular difference method. For SIMD- 256, we give a free-start near collision attack on the compression function reduced to 20 steps with complexity 2116. And for SIMD-512, we give a free-start near collision attack on the 24-step compression function with complexity 2235. Furthermore, we give a distinguisher attack for the full compression function of SIMD-512 with complexity 2475. Our attacks are also applicable for the final compression function of SIMD.