Communications of the ACM
The round complexity of verifiable secret sharing and secure multicast
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
New Results on Unconditionally Secure Distributed Oblivious Transfer
SAC '02 Revised Papers from the 9th Annual International Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography
On Unconditionally Secure Distributed Oblivious Transfer
INDOCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Cryptology: Progress in Cryptology
Distributed Oblivious Transfer
ASIACRYPT '00 Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Verifiable distributed oblivious transfer and mobile agent security
DIALM-POMC '03 Proceedings of the 2003 joint workshop on Foundations of mobile computing
Verifiable distributed oblivious transfer and mobile agent security
Mobile Networks and Applications
On Unconditionally Secure Distributed Oblivious Transfer
Journal of Cryptology
Verifiable secret sharing and achieving simultaneity in the presence of faults
SFCS '85 Proceedings of the 26th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
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In the various distributed oblivious transfer (DOT) protocols designed in an unconditionally secure environment, a receiver contacts k out of m servers to obtain one of the n secrets held by a sender. After a protocol has been executed, the sender has no information on the choice of the receiver and the receiver has no information on the secrets she did not obtain. These protocols are based on a semi-honest model: no mechanism prevents a group of malicious servers from disrupting the protocol such that the secret obtained by the receiver does not correspond to the chosen secret. This paper presents ongoing work towards the definition of the first unconditionally secure verifiable DOT protocol in the presence of an active adversary who may corrupt up to k - 1 servers. In addition to the active adversary, we also assume that the sender may (passively) corrupt up to k - 1 servers to learn the choice of the receiver. Similarly, the receiver may (passively) corrupt up to k - 1 servers to learn more than the chosen secret. Our DOT protocol allows the receiver to contact 4k - 3 servers to obtain one secret, while the required security is maintained.