Fundamentals of statistical signal processing: estimation theory
Fundamentals of statistical signal processing: estimation theory
Covert channels and anonymizing networks
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Anonymity vs. Information Leakage in Anonymity Systems
ICDCS '05 Proceedings of the 25th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
An evaluation of inter-vehicle ad hoc networks based on realistic vehicular traces
Proceedings of the 7th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
Elements of Information Theory (Wiley Series in Telecommunications and Signal Processing)
Elements of Information Theory (Wiley Series in Telecommunications and Signal Processing)
Preserving location privacy in wireless lans
Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Mobile systems, applications and services
Overhaul of ieee 802.11 modeling and simulation in ns-2
Proceedings of the 10th ACM Symposium on Modeling, analysis, and simulation of wireless and mobile systems
Anonymity protocols as noisy channels
Information and Computation
Wireless device identification with radiometric signatures
Proceedings of the 14th ACM international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Optimal data rate selection for vehicle safety communications
Proceedings of the fifth ACM international workshop on VehiculAr Inter-NETworking
Transient-based identification of wireless sensor nodes
IPSN '09 Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Information Processing in Sensor Networks
Physical Layer Attacks on Unlinkability in Wireless LANs
PETS '09 Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Towards an information theoretic metric for anonymity
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
PET'02 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Real-world VANET security protocol performance
GLOBECOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Global telecommunications
Hi-index | 0.00 |
Recently, there has been much interest in using radiometric identification (also known as wireless fingerprinting) for the purposes of authentication. Previous work has shown that using radiometric identification can discriminate among devices with a high degree of accuracy when simultaneously using multiple radiometric characteristics. Additionally, researchers have noted the potential for wireless fingerprinting to be used for more devious purposes, specifically that of privacy invasion or compromise. In fact, any such radiometric characteristic that is useful for authentication is useful for privacy compromise. To date, there has not been any proposal of how to mitigate such privacy loss for many of these radiometric characteristics, and specifically no such proposal for how to mitigate such privacy loss in a low-cost manner. In this paper, we investigate some limits of an attacker's ability to compromise privacy, specifically an attacker that uses a transmitter's carrier frequency. We propose low-cost mechanisms for mitigating privacy loss for various radiometric characteristics. In our development and evaluation, we specifically consider a vehicular network (VANET) environment. We consider this environment in particular because VANETs will have the potential to leak significant, long-term information that could be used to compromise drivers' personal information such as home address, work address, and the locations of any businesses the driver frequents. While tracking a vehicle using visually observable information (e.g., license plates) to obtain personal information is possible, such means require line-of-sight, whereas radiometric identification would not. Finally, we evaluate one of our proposed mechanisms via simulation. Specifically, we evaluate our carrier frequency switching mechanism, comparing it to the theory we develop, and we show the precision with which vehicles will need to switch their physical layer identities given our parameterization for VANETs.