Private information retrieval with a trusted hardware unit - revisited

Authors:
Lukasz Krzywiecki;Mirosław Kutyłowski;Hubert Misztela;Tomasz Strumiński
Affiliations:
Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science, Wrocław University of Technology, Wrocław, Poland;Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science, Wrocław University of Technology, Wrocław, Poland;Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science, Wrocław University of Technology, Wrocław, Poland;Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science, Wrocław University of Technology, Wrocław, Poland
Venue:
Inscrypt'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information security and cryptology
Year:
2010

Citing 8
Cited 0

Private information retrieval

FOCS '95 Proceedings of the 36th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Choosing a random peer

Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Protecting Client Privacy with Trusted Computing at the Server

IEEE Security and Privacy
An Efficient PIR Construction Using Trusted Hardware

ISC '08 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Information Security
Random Subsets of the Interval and P2P Protocols

APPROX '07/RANDOM '07 Proceedings of the 10th International Workshop on Approximation and the 11th International Workshop on Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques
A survey of single-database private information retrieval: techniques and applications

PKC'07 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Practice and theory in public-key cryptography
Uniformity of improved versions of chord

ICICA'10 Proceedings of the First international conference on Information computing and applications
Private information retrieval using trusted hardware

ESORICS'06 Proceedings of the 11th European conference on Research in Computer Security

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

During ISC'2008 Yanjiang Yang, Xuhua Ding, Robert H. Deng, and Feng Bao presented a construction for holding an encrypted database in a cloud so that the access pattern remains hidden. The scheme is designed for the case when a user holds a trusted hardware unit, which serves as an interface between the owner of the database and the untrusted environment where the encrypted database is stored. The scheme is relatively efficient and has some provable privacy properties. In this paper we analyze an idealized version of the above protocol and prove rigorously strong privacy conditions in a model with a powerful adversary observing all operations occurring in the cloud. On the other hand, we show that the full version of the protocol (with some implementation details), as proposed at ISC'2008, leaks some information about the access pattern of the user. This shows that the protocol does not fulfil the property of ideally private information retrieval. While this is not a general full scale attack, at some specific situations information leakage presented might have practical value for an adversary.