The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
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Fundamentals of Cryptology: A Professional Reference and Interactive Tutorial
PVS: Combining Specification, Proof Checking, and Model Checking
CAV '96 Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Computer Aided Verification
ESORICS '08 Proceedings of the 13th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
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Proceedings of the 36th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
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SS'08 Proceedings of the 17th conference on Security symposium
Models and Proofs of Protocol Security: A Progress Report
CAV '09 Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Computer Aided Verification
Computational indistinguishability logic
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A Survey of Symbolic Methods in Computational Analysis of Cryptographic Systems
Journal of Automated Reasoning
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The way that Mifare Classic smart cards work has been uncovered recently [6,8] and several vulnerabilities and exploits have emerged. This paper gives a precise logical formalisation of the essentials of the Mifare Classic card, in the language of a theorem prover (PVS). The formalisation covers the LFSR, the filter function and (parts of) the authentication protocol, thus serving as precise documentation of the card's ingredients and their properties. Additionally, the mathematics is described that makes two key-retrieval attacks from [6] work.