Bullet-proof verification (BPV) method to detect black hole attack in mobile ad hoc networks

Authors:
Firoz Ahmed;Seokhoon Yoon;Hoon Oh
Affiliations:
School of Electrical Engineering, University of Ulsan, Ulsan, South Korea;School of Electrical Engineering, University of Ulsan, Ulsan, South Korea;School of Electrical Engineering, University of Ulsan, Ulsan, South Korea
Venue:
UIC'11 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Ubiquitous intelligence and computing
Year:
2011

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Abstract

Mobile ad hoc networks are vulnerable to various security attacks due to the fact that a mobile node not only has a freedom of joining or leaving the network but also acts as a router. In this paper, we propose a bullet-proof verification (BPV) method to detect the black hole attack, either single or cooperative, in mobile ad hoc networks. The BPV method consists of two steps: every node first examines suspicious nodes using local neighborhood information and secondly, if a node receives RREP from a suspicious node, it sends an encrypted (bullet-proof) test message to the destination to confirm whether the suspicious node is black hole or not. The two-step approach not only pins down the black hole nodes, but also contributes to reducing control overhead. We prove by resorting to simulation that the BPV can be applied to the AODV without degrading performance notably and also is highly dependable against the black hole attack.