A game-theoretical model for inter-organisational collaboration in information systems development

Authors:
P. Ben Chou
Affiliations:
NJIT, School of Management, University Heights, Newark, NJ 07102-1982, USA
Venue:
International Journal of Information Technology and Management
Year:
2011

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Abstract

This paper develops a game-theoretical model to address different levels of cooperation between two firms that share their knowledge/information systems as a local public good. The model shows that the collaboration between two firms can lead to the creation of new knowledge/information technology, and that a higher speed of creating new knowledge can change the structure of the game from a prisoners' dilemma game to a coordination game as an evolutionary process. Therefore, despite the knowledge-sharing dilemma, it is possible for both firms to reach the stable and more efficient full-collaboration equilibrium than the Nash collaboration equilibrium.