Conditionally-perfect secrecy and a provably-secure randomized cipher
Journal of Cryptology - Eurocrypt '90
EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
GeoCast—geographic addressing and routing
MobiCom '97 Proceedings of the 3rd annual ACM/IEEE international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Dynamic fine-grained localization in Ad-Hoc networks of sensors
Proceedings of the 7th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Time Synchronization for Wireless Sensor Networks
IPDPS '01 Proceedings of the 15th International Parallel & Distributed Processing Symposium
Secure verification of location claims
WiSe '03 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Wireless security
Supporting location-based conditions in access control policies
ASIACCS '06 Proceedings of the 2006 ACM Symposium on Information, computer and communications security
Deterministic Secure Positioning in Wireless Sensor Networks
DCOSS '08 Proceedings of the 4th IEEE international conference on Distributed Computing in Sensor Systems
Secure and precise location verification using distance bounding and simultaneous multilateration
Proceedings of the second ACM conference on Wireless network security
A Location-Based Mechanism for Mobile Device Security
CSIE '09 Proceedings of the 2009 WRI World Congress on Computer Science and Information Engineering - Volume 01
CRYPTO '09 Proceedings of the 29th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Secure Distance-Based Localization in the Presence of Cheating Beacon Nodes
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Secure positioning in wireless networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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We consider secure positioning in wireless environments where mobile nodes use a trusted infrastructure to prove their location: a node claims a position and wants to prove to the verification infrastructure that it is actually located in that position. We propose a system that uses the notion of dynamic verifiers and provides security against collusion attack in which the adversary corrupts a set of nodes and its aim is to claim a position where none of the corrupted nodes are located. We give a detailed analysis of the system and show that under reasonable assumptions the protocol will reject false claims and the success probability of the adversary can be made arbitrarily small. We also give the results of our simulation that closely match the analysis. Our protocol is the first secure positioning protocol with security against collusion attack.