On a model of informational control in social networks

  • Authors:

  • D. N. Fedyanin;A. G. Chkhartishvili

  • Affiliations:

  • Repetit-center, Moscow, Russia;Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia

  • Venue:
  • Automation and Remote Control
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

We present an analysis of game model that represents a composition of Markov model of social network and a new model of behavior of the agents under lump sum payment of the principal. We calculated Nash equilibria, conditions on types of the agents within social network and found an algorithm of optimal control of social network. Based on these results, optimal control for types is developed which ensures maximum goal function of the principal.