Protecting Respondents' Identities in Microdata Release
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering
Statistical Identification of Encrypted Web Browsing Traffic
SP '02 Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Anatomy: simple and effective privacy preservation
VLDB '06 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Very large data bases
L-diversity: Privacy beyond k-anonymity
ACM Transactions on Knowledge Discovery from Data (TKDD)
Privacy-preserving data publishing: A survey of recent developments
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Side-Channel Leaks in Web Applications: A Reality Today, a Challenge Tomorrow
SP '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part II
k-indistinguishable traffic padding in web applications
PETS'12 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
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While web-based applications are gaining popularity, they also pose new security challenges. In particular, Chen et al. recently revealed that many popular Web applications actually leak out highly sensitive data from encrypted traffic due to side-channel attacks using packet sizes and timing [1]. They further demonstrated that existing solutions usually incur a high overhead while still not guaranteeing privacy protection. In this paper, we observe a striking similarity between this issue and another well studied problem, privacy-preserving data publishing (PPDP). Based on such a similarity, we propose a formal model for privacy-preserving traffic padding (PPTP) that encompasses privacy requirement, padding cost, and padding methods.