Performance analysis of multiple access protocols
Performance analysis of multiple access protocols
NeXt generation/dynamic spectrum access/cognitive radio wireless networks: a survey
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Investment decisions in the wireless industry applying real options
Telecommunications Policy
Towards real-time dynamic spectrum auctions
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Spectrum Bidding in Wireless Networks and Related
COCOON '08 Proceedings of the 14th annual international conference on Computing and Combinatorics
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Primary user behavior in cellular networks and implications for dynamic spectrum access
IEEE Communications Magazine
Spectrum management in cognitive radio ad hoc networks
IEEE Network: The Magazine of Global Internetworking - Special issue title on networking over multi-hop cognitive networks
Option-based dynamic management of wireless spectrum
NGI'09 Proceedings of the 5th Euro-NGI conference on Next Generation Internet networks
Spot pricing of secondary spectrum access in wireless cellular networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Pricing strategies for spectrum lease in secondary markets
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks: an auction-based approach
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part B: Cybernetics - Special issue on game theory
A framework for statistical wireless spectrum occupancy modeling
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
Time-limited leases in radio systems [Topics in Radio Communications]
IEEE Communications Magazine
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Reservations represent an alternative implementation of secondary markets for spectrum with respect to spot selling through auctions. In a previous paper we have shown that reservation mechanisms may be profitable to mobile operators, be they virtual or endowed with a network, assuming the reservation price as a parameter. Pricing reservations, when the owner of spectrum usage rights applies overbooking and pays a penalty if the reservation is not honoured, is still an open issue. Here we propose an iterative algorithm, based on tools derived from the field of financial markets, to set prices for reservations under overbooking. We analyse the sensitivity of the reservation price to a number of parameters (the purchase price, the expiration time of reservation, the overbooking probability, and the penalty value), and show that the reservation prices decay fast with the overbooking probability, and increase with the penalty value, but short expiration times may make the penalty ineffective.