Personal Identity, Agency and the Multiplicity Thesis

  • Authors:
  • Dave Ward

  • Affiliations:
  • School of Humanities, University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield, Hertfordshire, UK AL10 9AB

  • Venue:
  • Minds and Machines
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

I consider whether there is a plausible conception of personal identity that can accommodate the `Multiplicity Thesis' (MT), the thesis that some ways of creating and deploying multiple distinct online personae can bring about the existence of multiple persons where before there was only one. I argue that an influential Kantian line of thought, according to which a person is a unified locus of rational agency, is well placed to accommodate the thesis. I set out such a line of thought as developed by Carol Rovane, and consider the conditions that would have to be in place for the possibility identified by MT to be realised. Finally I briefly consider the prospects for MT according to neo-Lockean and animalist views of personhood.