Alternating-time temporal logic
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Extensive Games as Process Models
Journal of Logic, Language and Information
A logic for strategic reasoning
Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Computing Equilibria in Anonymous Games
FOCS '07 Proceedings of the 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Symmetries and the complexity of pure Nash equilibrium
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Dynamic restriction of choices: a preliminary logical report
Proceedings of the 12th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
Intentions and strategies in game-like scenarios
EPIA'05 Proceedings of the 12th Portuguese conference on Progress in Artificial Intelligence
Strategies in games: a logic-automata study
ESSLLI'10 Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ESSLLI 2010, and ESSLLI 2011 conference on Lectures on Logic and Computation
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We study a game model to highlight the mutual recursiveness of individual rationality and societal rationality. These are games that change intrinsically based on the actions / strategies played by the players. There is an implicit player - the society, who makes actions available to players and incurs certain costs in doing so. If and when it feels that an action a is being played by a small number of players and/or it becomes too expensive for it to maintain the action a, it removes a from the set of available actions. This results in a change in the game and the players strategise afresh taking this change into account. We study the question: which actions of the players should the society restrict and how should it restrict them so that the social cost is minimised in the eventuality? We address two variations of the question: when the players are maximisers, can society choose an order of their moves so that social cost is minimised, and which actions may be restricted when players play according to given strategy specifications.