A dynamic analysis of interactive rationality

Authors:
Eric Pacuit;Olivier Roy
Affiliations:
Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science;Center for Mathematical Philosophy, LMU
Venue:
LORI'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Logic, rationality, and interaction
Year:
2011

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Abstract

Epistemic game theory has shown the importance of informational contexts in understanding strategic interaction. We propose a general framework to analyze how such contexts may arise. The idea is to view informational contexts as the fixed-points of iterated, "rational responses" to incoming information about the agents' possible choices. We show general conditions for the stabilization of such sequences of rational responses, in terms of structural properties of both the decision rule and the information update policy.