Note: An algorithm for a super-stable roommates problem

Authors:
Tamás Fleiner;Robert W. Irving;David F. Manlove
Affiliations:
Department of Computer Science and Information Theory, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Magyar Tudósok körútja 2, Budapest, H-1117, Hungary;School of Computing Science, University of Glasgow, G12 8QQ, UK;School of Computing Science, University of Glasgow, G12 8QQ, UK
Venue:
Theoretical Computer Science
Year:
2011

Citing 6
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Abstract

In this paper, we describe an efficient algorithm that decides if a stable matching exists for a generalized stable roommates problem, where, instead of linear preferences, agents have partial preference orders on potential partners. Furthermore, we may forbid certain partnerships, that is, we are looking for a matching such that none of the matched pairs is forbidden, and yet, no blocking pair (forbidden or not) exists. To solve the above problem, we generalize the first algorithm for the ordinary stable roommates problem.