Optimal solutions for multi-unit combinatorial auctions: branch and bound heuristics
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Towards a universal test suite for combinatorial auction algorithms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An efficient approximate allocation algorithm for combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Solving Combinatorial Auctions Using Stochastic Local Search
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
An Algorithm for Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Combinatorial Auctions
IAT '06 Proceedings of the IEEE/WIC/ACM international conference on Intelligent Agent Technology
An experimental analysis of biased parallel greedy approximation for combinatorial auctions
International Journal of Intelligent Information and Database Systems
PRIMA'11 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Agent Based Simulation for a Sustainable Society and Multi-agent Smart Computing
WI-IAT '12 Proceedings of the The 2012 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conferences on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 03
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Multi-unit combinatorial auction is a combinatorial auction that has some items that can bee seen as indistinguishable. Although the mechanism can be applied for dynamic electricity auctions and various purposes, it is difficult to be applied for large-scale auction problems due to its computational intractability. In this paper, I introduce a mechanism that employs an approximate allocation and pricing algorithm that is capable to handle multi-unit auctions. The algorithm effectively produce approximation allocations that are necessary in pricing and it behaves as an approximation of VCG(Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism satisfying budget balance condition and bidders' individual rationality without having single-minded bidders assumption. I show that the proposed allocation algorithm successfully produced good allocations for the problems that cannot be easily solved by ordinary LP solvers due to hard time constraints.