Architectural support for secure virtualization under a vulnerable hypervisor
Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture
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In conventional virtualized systems, a hypervisor can access the memory pages of guest virtual machines without any restriction, as the hypervisor has a full control over the address translation mechanism. In this paper, we propose Secure MMU, a hardware-based mechanism to isolate the memory of guest virtual machines from unauthorized accesses even from the hypervisor. The proposed mechanism extends the current nested paging support for virtualization with a small hardware cost. With Secure MMU, the hypervisor can flexibly allocate physical memory pages to virtual machines for resource management, but update nested page tables only through the secure hardware mechanism, which verifies each mapping change. With the hardware-rooted memory isolation among virtual machines, the memory of a virtual machine in cloud computing can be securely protected from a compromised hypervisor or co-tenant virtual machines.