Bro: a system for detecting network intruders in real-time
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
PKI: It's Not Dead, Just Resting
Computer
Building a time machine for efficient recording and retrieval of high-volume network traffic
IMC '05 Proceedings of the 5th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet Measurement
Dynamic application-layer protocol analysis for network intrusion detection
USENIX-SS'06 Proceedings of the 15th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 15
Cryptographic strength of ssl/tls servers: current and recent practices
Proceedings of the 7th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement
Attacks on the RC4 stream cipher
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
Chosen-Prefix Collisions for MD5 and Colliding X.509 Certificates for Different Identities
EUROCRYPT '07 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
When private keys are public: results from the 2008 Debian OpenSSL vulnerability
Proceedings of the 9th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement conference
So long, and no thanks for the externalities: the rational rejection of security advice by users
NSPW '09 Proceedings of the 2009 workshop on New security paradigms workshop
Comparing and improving current packet capturing solutions based on commodity hardware
IMC '10 Proceedings of the 10th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement
High speed network traffic analysis with commodity multi-core systems
IMC '10 Proceedings of the 10th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement
Factorization of a 768-bit RSA modulus
CRYPTO'10 Proceedings of the 30th annual conference on Advances in cryptology
Mining your Ps and Qs: detection of widespread weak keys in network devices
Security'12 Proceedings of the 21st USENIX conference on Security symposium
One year of SSL internet measurement
Proceedings of the 28th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Here's my cert, so trust me, maybe?: understanding TLS errors on the web
Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on World Wide Web
Analysis of the HTTPS certificate ecosystem
Proceedings of the 2013 conference on Internet measurement conference
No attack necessary: the surprising dynamics of SSL trust relationships
Proceedings of the 29th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Validating web content with senser
Proceedings of the 29th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Alice in warningland: a large-scale field study of browser security warning effectiveness
SEC'13 Proceedings of the 22nd USENIX conference on Security
ZMap: fast internet-wide scanning and its security applications
SEC'13 Proceedings of the 22nd USENIX conference on Security
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The SSL and TLS infrastructure used in important protocols like HTTPs and IMAPs is built on an X.509 public-key infrastructure (PKI). X.509 certificates are thus used to authenticate services like online banking, shopping, e-mail, etc. However, it always has been felt that the certification processes of this PKI may lack in stringency, resulting in a deployment where many certificates do not meet the requirements of a secure PKI. This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of X.509 certificates in the wild. To shed more light on the state of the deployed and actually used X.509 PKI, we obtained and evaluated data from many different sources. We conducted HTTPs scans of a large number of popular HTTPs servers over a 1.5-year time span, including scans from nine locations distributed over the globe. To compare certification properties of highly ranked hosts with the global picture, we included a third-party scan of the entire IPv4 space in our analyses. Furthermore, we monitored live SSL/TLS traffic on a 10Gbps uplink of a large research network. This allows us to compare the properties of the deployed PKI with the part of the PKI that is being actively accessed by users. Our analysis reveals that the quality of certification lacks in stringency, due to a number of reasons among which incorrect certification chains or invalid certificate subjects give the most cause for concern. Similar concerns can be raised for the properties of certification chains and many self-signed certificates used in the deployed X.509 PKI. Our findings confirm what has long been believed -- namely that the X.509 PKI we often use in our everyday's lives is in a sorry state.