How to Own the Internet in Your Spare Time
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
JAM: A Jammed-Area Mapping Service for Sensor Networks
RTSS '03 Proceedings of the 24th IEEE International Real-Time Systems Symposium
The dynamic behavior of a data dissemination protocol for network programming at scale
SenSys '04 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Embedded networked sensor systems
SCUBA: Secure Code Update By Attestation in sensor networks
WiSe '06 Proceedings of the 5th ACM workshop on Wireless security
Towards self-propagate mal-packets in sensor networks
WiSec '08 Proceedings of the first ACM conference on Wireless network security
Secure multi-hop network programming with multiple one-way key chains
WiSec '08 Proceedings of the first ACM conference on Wireless network security
Code injection attacks on harvard-architecture devices
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
secFleck: A Public Key Technology Platform for Wireless Sensor Networks
EWSN '09 Proceedings of the 6th European Conference on Wireless Sensor Networks
On the difficulty of software-based attestation of embedded devices
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Detecting node compromise in hybrid wireless sensor networks using attestation techniques
ESAS'07 Proceedings of the 4th European conference on Security and privacy in ad-hoc and sensor networks
Remote software-based attestation for wireless sensors
ESAS'05 Proceedings of the Second European conference on Security and Privacy in Ad-Hoc and Sensor Networks
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Given the limited resources and computational power of current embedded sensor devices, memory protection is difficult to achieve and generally unavailable. Hence, the software run-time buffer overflow that is used by the worm attacks in the Internet could be easily exploited to inject malicious codes into Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). Previous software-based remote code verification approaches such as SWATT and SCUBA have been shown difficult to deploy in recent work. In this paper, we propose and implement a remote attestation protocol for detecting unauthorized tampering in the application codes running on sensor nodes with the assistance of Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs), the tiny, cost-effective and tamper-proof cryptographic microcontrollers. In our design, each sensor node is equipped with a TPM and the firmware running on the node could be verified by the other sensor nodes in a WSN, including the sink. Specifically, we present a hardware-based remote attestation protocol, discuss the potential attacks an adversary could launch against the protocol, and provide comprehensive system performance results of the protocol in a multi-hop sensor network testbed.